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ABSTRACT
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by Muddasser Alam
With the advent of proposals for new energy generation and distribution systems such
as microgeneration, microgrids and smart grids, comes the possibility of the exchange of
energy between smart houses. Energy exchange has already been found eective for the
ecient use of energy on large scale such as between electric companies. In this work,
we show how energy exchange can also be benecial on a smaller scale. We develop
a proof-of-concept model of two houses each with some microgeneration units and an
energy storage device. We compute the optimal energy allocation in each house when
energy exchange in not an option. We then show how these houses can use axiomatic
bargaining in general and the Nash bargaining solution in particular, to exchange energy.
We compare the utility of houses when the exchange is an option and when it is not and
conclude that energy exchange can result in better utilities for the houses. We then list
our planned future work in order to make such exchange feasible between houses.Contents
Nomenclature vi
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 Benets of Energy Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Research Challenges of Energy Exchange in Houses . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4 Research requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.5 Research Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.6 Research Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.7 Structure of the report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2 Literature Review 15
2.1 Enabling Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.1.1 Microgeneration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.1.2 Energy Storage Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2 Agent-Based Energy Resource Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2.1 Single Agent Systems for Energy Resource Management . . . . . . 17
2.2.2 Multiagent Systems for Energy Resource Management . . . . . . . 19
2.3 Bargaining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3.1 Characteristics of Bargaining Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3.2 Axiomatic Bargaining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3.2.1 Nash Bargaining Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3.2.2 Utilitarian Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.3.2.3 Egalitarian Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3.2.4 Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3.3 Strategic bargaining Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3.4 Which bargaining solution is appropriate for the energy exchange
problem? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.4 Energy Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.4.1 Fixed-surcharge energy exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.4.2 Market-based energy exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.4.3 Pure Barter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.4.4 Barter with side payments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.5 Peer-2-Peer Energy Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3 Cooperative Energy Barter in Microgrids 33
iiCONTENTS iii
3.1 Problem Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.1.1 Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.1.2 Time periods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.1.3 Power Generation Prole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.1.4 Load Prole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.1.5 Available Power Prole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.1.6 Preference Prole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.1.7 Utility Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.1.8 Battery Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.1.9 Wasted Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.1.10 Transmission Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.1.11 Regulator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.1.12 Summary of the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.2 Optimal Energy Use Without Energy Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.3 Optimal Energy Use With Energy Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.3.1 Nash Bargaining Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.3.2 Optimization results via the Nash bargaining solution: Agent A . 47
3.3.3 Optimization results via the Nash bargaining solution: Agent B . . 49
3.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4 Conclusions and Future Work 53
4.1 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.2 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Bibliography 56List of Figures
2.1 A smart house . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2 Energy demand and generation cost. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3 Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.1 A visual description of the model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2 Agent A: Proles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.3 Agent A: Local Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.4 Agent A: Utility with and without a battery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.5 Agent B: Proles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.6 Agent B: Local Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.7 Agent A: Optimization via the Nash bargaining solution . . . . . . . . . 49
3.8 Agent B: Optimization via the Nash bargaining solution . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.1 Gantt chart of planned work until Minithesis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
ivList of Tables
3.1 Summary of the model notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.2 Agent A: Local Optimization results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.3 Agent B: Local Optimization results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.4 Utility comparison for Agent A: with and without energy exchange . . . . 50
3.5 Utility comparison for Agent B: with and without energy exchange . . . . 52
vNomenclature
AP Set of available power at each time period.
apt A member of AP.
B Maximum storage capacity of a battery.
BF Set of battery ows at each time period.
bft A member of BF.
Cr 
r Maximum discharging rate of a battery.
Cr+
r Maximum charging rate of a battery.
L Set of loads at each time period.
lt A member of L.
Link Set of power transfers over transmission line.
linkt Member of Link.
P Set of preferences at each time period.
pt A member of P.
PG Set of power generation at each time period.
pgt A member of PG.
Q Set of battery charge state at each time period.
qt A member of Q.
T Set of time periods, jTj = 24.
t A member of T.
tc Maximum transmission capacity.
u overall utility, i.e.
P
t ut.
ut utility at time period t.
W Set of waste energy at each time period.
wt A member of W.
viChapter 1
Introduction
One of the main challenges of 21st century is to meet the ever-increasing global demand
for energy. It has been estimated that this demand will be more than 50% higher in
2030 than today (IEA, 2008). Meeting this demand with fossil fuels poses two main
problems. Firstly, fossil fuels are nite and despite the controversy over the amount left
in the earth, there is no escape from the fact that we will run out one day. Secondly, the
burning of fossil fuel is a major contributor of CO2 emission, one of the greenhouse gases,
which accelerates climate change. It has been estimated that energy-related greenhouse
gas emissions will be around 30% higher in 2035 than today (Stern, 2008).
The continued reliance on fossil fuel also creates additional issues. The future energy
demand estimates presented above are based on today's scenario and given the growing
dependence of our society on power-hungry machines in our daily life, these estimates
may be well below the real demand, worsening the crisis. Also, the escalating energy
needs of emerging economies such as China and India and their wish to maintain their
astonishing rate of economic growth, are likely to create tougher and more bitter com-
petition for energy. Increasingly disputes over territories such as waters around the
Falkland Islands, Barents Sea, Arctic seabed and Middle East are incited by the likely
presence of energy resources in these areas. Furthermore, accidents that occur during
the extraction and processing of fossil fuels are costly to humans and the environment
(a recent example is the accident in Gulf of Mexico).
The hazards and issues with fossil fuels have long been identied and the need to con-
sume fossil fuels more wisely and to seek cleaner and sustainable energy resources, have
long been advocated. The suggested proposals are quite diverse in nature and exam-
ples include microgeneration, microgrids, smart houses and smart grids. Each proposal
focuses a particular area to improve ecient energy use. For example, microgeneration
proposes the generation of energy on a very small scale to avoid energy loss at the point
of generation and transmission. For instance, in coal-red power stations, energy is lost
to the air through the cooling towers in the form of hot air. Energy loss in such power
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stations can be somewhere between 1/3 to 2/3, followed by further energy loss in the
transfer of electricity to consumers through power lines. On the other hand, micro-CHP
(combined heat and power) units in homes generate electricity and the waste heat is used
for space-heating. Given that in the UK, almost 50% of the primary energy consumption
is used to provide heating and hot water in buildings (Abu-Sharkh et al., 2006) this can
be a signicant step to use energy more eciently.
More generally, microgeneration is dened as the small-scale production of heat and/or
electricity from a low carbon source.1 It includes energy generation from small wind
turbines, photovoltaic solar systems, geo-thermal, micro-CHP, micro hydro, fuel cells
and biomass burners. Microgeneration is considered to be a key technology to address
energy and emission issues and countries across the globe are encouraging the use of
microgeneration technologies in homes. For example, the UK Government launched
a scheme in 2006 to incentivise households to use microgeneration, particularly the
renewable energy generation such as wind turbines (BERR, 2008a). This has resulted
in approximately 100,000 microgeneration installations across the UK (BERR, 2008b,
p. 2).
Another proposal aimed at energy eciency is the future vision of a smart house. A
smart house consists of programmable electronic controls and sensors that can regulate
heating, cooling, lighting., ventilation and other equipments to conserve energy or to
reduce carbon emission (Stauer, 1991; Christian et al., 2010; Davidsson and Boman,
2000). This energy and appliance controlling system is usually referred to as a house
energy controller. It monitors the use of energy in the house and it may control energy
demand via dynamic scheduling of energy-consuming tasks. This process is known as
load-deferral. Though not strictly a part of their denition, smart houses are envisioned
to be equipped with microgeneration and energy storage devices (e.g. an electric bat-
tery). Microgeneration units can generate low-carbon energy for smart houses and the
energy storage devices can help use energy more eciently.
The houses equipped with microgeneration units can be connected together to form a
microgrid (Markvart, 2006). A microgrid is a small-scale power supply network that is
designed to provide power for a small community (Abu-Sharkh et al., 2006). Microgrids
can respond to local demands more eciently and can operate independently of the
traditional power grid which makes them more reliable in case of grid failure.
On a larger scale, the idea of a smart grid has been proposed. Initially suggested
by Schweppe (Schweppe et al., 1980), smart grids are basically an advanced form of
electricity grids where information and communication technologies are incorporated to
ensure information ow between suppliers and consumers (DECC, 2009). The purpose
of enabling communication between the suppliers and consumers is to avoid peak times,
times when demands are higher. The relation between demand and the cost of energy
1Energy Act 2004 - Section 82,UK available online at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2004Chapter 1 Introduction 3
generation or the volume of carbon emissions can be linear up to a certain threshold and
afterwards it increases rapidly in a non-linear fashion as more expensive means of energy
generation (such as diesel generators) kick in. Avoiding peaks in demands reduces the
use of such expensive and carbon-intensive sources and thus results in savings of both
money and carbon emissions.
Though, the aspiration of the smart grid idea is to replace the traditional electricity grid,
it is equally applicable on a smaller scale such as a microgrid of smart houses discussed
above. Smart grid technologies that facilitate connectivity and real-time information
ow can enable such a network to make informed decisions about the energy supply
and demand and use energy more eciently. In this sense, smart houses are the energy
suppliers as well as the consumers.
This microgrid of smart houses opens up the possibility of energy exchange between
houses. These houses may have diverse demands patterns depicting the preferences and
lifestyle of the household. Also, they may have dierent microgeneration technologies
and therefore, may have diversity in energy generation too. Apart from controlling
demands and supply to use energy more eciently, energy exchange between these houses
can also be useful . For example, a house with solar panels may provide extra energy
to a neighbour house with wind turbine. This house can return this energy later in the
evening to the rst house which may have to rely on expensive means of generation in
the evening.
Energy exchange has already shown to result in the ecient use of energy on a larger
scale. For example, it has been shown that energy exchange in utility companies can
lead to better energy management and savings (Ruusunen et al., 1991). Also, there
are practical examples of energy exchange between countries (e.g. Finland and Sweden)
and between cities of a country (e.g. New Dehli and Madhya Pradesh).2 We argue
that the energy exchange between houses can also lead to the same results of better
energy management, less energy loss and reduction in carbon emissions. Though, the
concept of energy exchange between houses has yet to receive the attention it deserves,
it has started to gain increasing attention. An example is the vision of symmetric energy
exchange between connected sustainable homes3. We, therefore, aim to explore this area
and to investigate whether energy exchange can result in ecient energy use and if so,
what methods are available to ensure that this energy exchange results in ecient and
fair use of energy.
In the following section, we show an example to further motivate energy exchange be-
tween houses.
2Times of India, October 10, 2006
3See Connected Sustainable Home project, Massachusetts Institute of Technology - http://mobile.
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1.1 Scenario
In a neighbourhood of a small town, a small number of smart houses are connected to
form a microgrid. One of these smart houses has solar panels installed on the roof. On a
typical day, the energy controller device of this house gets energy from solar panels during
the day time and uses it immediately, or stores it for later, based on the demands and
preferences of the household. On a very sunny day when the solar panels can generate
more power than the total demand and storage capacity in the house, the controller
device decides to lend some power to a neighbouring house. It starts negotiating an
energy exchange with a neighbouring house which has a wind turbine and currently
has diculty meeting its demand. The energy controller device oers its neighbour a
constant power of 5 kW from 12:30 PM till 3:30 PM (a total of 15 kWh of energy) on
the condition that it will return the 25 kWh after four days when the weather forecast is
for a windy but cloudy day. However, the energy controller of this house considers that
the demand is not fair and make a counter oer of a 20 kWh at a constant rate of 4 kW
for 5 hours on that day. The rst energy controller knows that on that day its energy
generation can not meet its demand (since it is a cloudy day) and it will have to run a
micro-CHP unit to meet with demand on that day which will result in a raise in the gas
bill as well as in the carbon footprint of the household who are environment-conscious.
Thus, it considers the counter oer to be reasonable and accepts it. Since the houses
are already linked, the energy controller device has no problem in providing power to
the other house and receiving it back as per the agreement.
This general scenario shows how an energy exchange can lead to ecient energy use.
In the following section, we give very specic examples to show the merits of energy
exchange.
1.2 Benets of Energy Exchange
The following section lists the motivation of energy exchange. With each motivation,
we give an example where this exchange can result in ecient energy use and reduced
carbon emissions.
1. Ecient Use of Energy
Imagine a windy evening when the wind turbines are generating their maximum
output power, producing more energy than can be used by each individual house
equipped with a wind turbine. Such is not the case for the houses with solar panels
and they may have to use some other more costly or carbon intensive microgen-
eration units (e.g. micro-CHP which burns natural gas) to generate energy. In
such scenario, the houses with wind turbines may lend some energy to the housesChapter 1 Introduction 5
with solar panels. These solar-panel houses may return this energy during daytime
when the wind is not blowing. In such cases, these houses can exchange energy to
minimize wastage and make more ecient use of their resources.
2. Avoiding Energy Storage Loss
Following the above example, when a house has more generation capacity than
the demand and opts to store energy, then some of this energy is lost. This loss is
known as the storage loss and results due to the fact that no energy storage device
is 100% ecient. Now imagine that this house lends this energy to another house
which needs to use it right away. This house uses the energy and returns the same
amount of energy later. Thus, energy is not stored and therefore the storage loss
is avoided. Energy loss in storage depends on many factors including the duration
it was stored for, the type and operational age of the storage device and it can
be signicant in some cases. For example, in lead-acid batteries it could be up to
24% (Stevens and Corey, 1996). Therefore, energy sharing can help reduce energy
storage losses and may also mean that smaller capacity storage devices can be
used.
3. Coping with intermittent energy
Given that renewable energy resources are intermittent as they are dependent on
the weather, one technical solution is to use a reserve generator to ensure a constant
supply or in other words, to stabilize the output. In the case of a smart house, this
reserve generator could be a micro-CHP. However, we argue that energy exchange
can help cope with this intermittency as the power from renewable energy can be
augmented by borrowing some power from a neighbour to stabilize the output.
Imagine a group of houses coordinating their micro-CHPs so that only one micro-
CHP at a time is used as a backup energy generator to stabilize power in houses.
Thus, the houses can take turns to run their micro-CHP but only one house will
need to keep a micro-CHP running at a time. Therefore, the use of micro-CHP
can be reduced and the intermittency problem can be overcome more eectively.
4. Coping with sudden demand
Occasionally, there can be sudden peaks in energy demands which can not be
met by the individual homes own installed microgeneration units. For example, a
household may have invited some guests for a party. In such cases, other houses
may pour additional energy into the network to cope with sudden demand. The
house with additional energy demand may use this energy and return it later. In
such cases, energy exchange provides an opportunity to cover unusual demands.
Also, a house averts the need to install more microgeneration units to meet with
occasional demands. 4
4In contrast, the grid must have installed capacity for peak demands even though this might only be
used very occasionally.Chapter 1 Introduction 6
5. Extra storage space
Building on above example, houses in an energy network have access to a wider
range of microgeneration units and storage devices. For occasional needs, they can
borrow some power without the need to install new equipment. The same holds for
storage when they have additional power. For example, some consecutive strong
windy days may produce more energy than the storage device in houses with wind
turbines can store. Thus, the house may utilize someone's storage facility to store
this energy. The amount of energy stored is the result of cooperation between two
houses and thus it can be divided between these houses according to some criteria
or contract established before this cooperation took place.
6. Reducing carbon emissions
Electricity and heating in residential buildings makes up 10% of global carbon
emissions (Baumert et al., 2005, p. 5). Apart from the renewable (or zero carbon)
energy resource, there is a strong positive correlation between energy generation
or consumption and carbon emissions. Thus, using energy eciently and reducing
energy losses can help us reduce carbon emissions. We have already argued that
energy exchange can be useful in using energy eciently and to avoid storage losses.
Thus, with energy exchange we may need to generate less energy. Generating less
energy means less carbon emission and therefore, energy exchange can be helpful
in carbon reduction.
1.3 Research Challenges of Energy Exchange in Houses
We have stated many merits of energy exchange is houses. However, for this idea to be
materialize, we need to consider a number of challenges. The house energy controller in
above examples are selsh in the sense that their main objective is to meet their own
demands eciently. There is no central authority or body which can enforce an energy
controller to take part in an exchange if that exchange does not oer any benet to
it. Thus, an energy exchange between them must be benecial for all. Such problems
where participants are selsh and interested in their own benet are more dicult to
solve than the problems where participants are benevolent and willing to help others
even if it is at the expense of their own benet.
Beneting all participants in an exchange is a general requirement. Indeed, the benet
to each individual should be equal or fair in some regard; for the exchange to be an
acceptable agreement. For instance, if an energy controller has 10 kWh more energy
than its storage device can cope with and wants a neighbouring energy controller to store
this energy for it in order to save this energy, then any non-zero split of this energy,
summing to 10 kWh, is benecial for both controllers. Each controller will favour the
split where it gets the larger share. In such situations, they may settle down for aChapter 1 Introduction 7
fair split. However, there is no agreed denition of what a fair share is and the notion
of fairness is ercely debated among philosophers and researchers (Fehr and Schmidt,
1999). The challenge is to nd a way to ensure an equal and acceptable benet to all
participants.
A single energy exchange can have multiple characteristics. For example, the amount of
energy transferred and returned, time of transfer and return, power maintained during
transfer and during return, duration of transfer and return etc. This kind of discussion
over multiple issues is harder to solve than a single issue discussion. Also, a single energy
exchange agreement (e.g. exchange over a day) can have multiple energy exchange each
having multiple characteristics. Thus, the participants need to consider multiple issues
for an energy exchange which is more complicated than the discussion over single issue.
Furthermore, these discussions have a deadline. For example, if an energy controller
knows that it can generate an extra 10 kWh between 9 AM and 11 AM then it must
conclude its discussion with another house before 9 AM (assuming this controller can
not store this extra energy). Therefore, for this case the deadline is 9 AM and if it
cannot reach an agreement before this deadline then the opportunity to generate energy
will be lost.
Another challenge is the fact that in this kind of discussion a participant does not know
everything about the other participants. They may not know the generation and storage
capacity, energy usage pattern or preference of each other which makes it harder to asses
whether an oer would be accepted or what counter-oer will be made. One solution is
to ask each participants to declare all the relevant information for other participants to
make it easier to reach an agreement favourable to all. However, since the participants
are selsh, there is always a possibility of them misreporting this information in order
to manipulate the agreement in their favour.
A further aspect of the energy exchange between houses is the fact that the renewable
energy resources are weather dependent and therefore their output has some uncertainty
associated for a given time period. During the discussion, the participants have to
consider this possibility that they may not be able to provide energy at an agreed
period. In this case, they may have to run some other microgeneration units to make
for this shortfall. However, it could be costly for them and they should consider this
possibility before agreeing an exchange.
Finally, an important challenge is the distinction between energy exchange and energy
trading. In energy trading, the participants can buy and sell energy to each other and
can pay in terms of currency (real or virtual). However, in energy exchanges, as the
word implies, energy is exchanged rather than bought or sold. We are predominately
interested in the energy exchange as it can be useful in situation when the payment is
not much important or when it is not feasible. For example, if two buildings of the same
organization, such as a university, exchange energy with each other then payments mayChapter 1 Introduction 8
not be required. Also, in developing countries or in remote areas, payment mechanisms
can be dicult to implement due to the absence of banking systems.
1.4 Research requirements
Given the research challenges we discussed above, we infer the following the research
requirements that any good solution to energy exchange problem must possess.
1. Benecial to all
A solution must be benecial to all participants. This is required to ensure that
selsh participants are interested to take part in an exchange.
2. Fair
The benet each participant receives should equate in some manner. In other
words, it should be fair and justiable according to some agreed criteria. Where
it is not possible to give equal benet to each participant, for example due to
limited storage capacity of the receiver or some transmission constraint, then the
requirement the rst requirement of beneting all must prevail.
3. Scalable
The solution must be scalable from a minimum of two houses to small microgrid.
4. Decentralized
Since each energy controller can only control its own installations and is interested
to maximize its own benet, there is no central authority or control in action
that can ensure an optimal and fair solution. Also, the participants may not be
willing to reveal all their information to other participants. These aspects makes
it dicult to compute a centralized solution and therefore the solution must be
applicable in decentralized settings.
5. Robust
Since the participants are selsh, they can provide misleading information in order
to get more benets. A solution must withstand this eect.
6. Adaptable
The output power from renewable energy resources is uncertain and any solution
for energy exchange must take this fact into consideration and should be able to
cope up in such scenario.
7. Pareto ecient
This property refers to the situation where no participant can do better without
making someone worse o. For example, if there is some energy left which is
of no importance to any participant but one, then it must be allocated to thatChapter 1 Introduction 9
participant, otherwise this solution will not be a Pareto-ecient solution. This
ensures that no energy is wasted during energy exchange.
8. Timely
As we discussed earlier, energy generation is associate with time and therefore
energy exchange must take place within a specic time period. A solution to such
problem must be take this eect into account and also must be to compute an
agreement before the deadline.
9. No payment mechanisms
Since, we are interested in energy exchange solutions where payment mechanisms
are not required, the solution should not consider payments between participants.
These key requirements and the description of the energy exchange problem such as
decentralized control, adaptability and Pareto-eciency are common to many domains.
In the following paragraph, we introduce and discuss such candidate disciplines from
which we will withdraw results:
Multiagent Systems
Firstly, we can see that there are certain similarities between the requirements of this
problem and a computer science discipline that studies multiagent systems. An agent or
software agent is a computer program that acts on behalf of a user. Unlike a typical soft-
ware program, an agent is not invoked or executed for a specic task rather they activate
themselves. Agents pursuing a goal or some desired outcome may learn or incorporate
knowledge to exhibit intelligence. Such agents are called intelligent agents and a group
of such agents interacting with each other or with the surrounding environment is called
a multiagent system.
Multiagent systems (MAS) appear to be a good discipline to seek a solution for our
problem. For example, a MAS is a group of agents which interact with each other in a
decentralised and distributed manner. Furthermore, these agents can be selsh and are
thus interested only in their own utility. This is exactly the case in the energy sharing
problem where houses controller device are interested in their own benet. Furthermore,
there is no central authority and the houses are connected in a peer-to-peer fashion, a
natural choice for decentralized and distributed solution. MAS are robust as there is no
single point of failure and in general an individual agent's failure does not undermine
the whole system function. MAS are scalable as a single MAS may contain hundreds
or even thousands of agents. All these characteristics make the multiagent systems a
strong candidate to model our problem.
Game Theory
Though, the entities of our problem can eectively be modeled as agents, the dynamics
of their interactions are more complex. The agents interact to pursue their own goals.
They have their own requirements, resources and actions which they employ for theirChapter 1 Introduction 10
own benet. Such selsh agents have their own agenda and they plan accordingly to
play against other agents to pursue their goals. However, the outcome of such inter-
action depends on the actions of other agents too. The dynamics of of these strategic
interactions have been studied in a great detail in the eld of game theory.
Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics which has been used in many disci-
plines, especially in economics. It attempts to mathematically capture the behaviour of
players in a strategic situation (i.e. where outcomes depend on the actions of all play-
ers). Therefore, game theory provides an ideal platform to systematically study these
interactions in multiagent systems. Game theory provides solution concepts to predict
the outcome of such games and to analyze the properties of such outcomes.
Game theory can be divided into two branches, cooperative and non-cooperative game
theory. A cooperative game is one in which players are able to make enforceable con-
tracts. The emphasis in this eld is to investigate the outcomes of such games along
with their properties and the methods to reach desired outcomes. In non-cooperative
game theory, agents are usually competing against each other and the emphasis in this
eld is to study the strategies and states this competition leads to. In particular, the
resulting equilibrium states have been studied in a great detail in non-cooperative game
theory.
Based on the players interaction, games can be divided into static or dynamic games. In
static games, players move simultaneously while in dynamic games (also called sequential
games) players take turns.
Perhaps what makes game theory the most valuable tool is its ability to predict game
outcomes even when there is a uncertainty involved around the actions or stages of a
game. This is a core requirement of our solution where outcome are associated with
uncertainty in the power generation. These outcomes are predicted by dierent solution
concepts such as the Nash equilibrium.
Solution concepts oer a good way to predict how the game will be player and the
outcome of the game. For example, Nash equilibrium is a solution concept which states
that a game is in an equilibrium state if none of the player wants to change its strategy
given the strategy of other players. Nash equilibrium provides a good way of analyzing
static games. An equivalent solution concept for dynamic games is the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium. A strategy prole, set of strategies for each player, is said to be in the
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if it represent a Nash equilibrium in every subgame
of the original game.
Given the rich methods to model, predict and analyze the complex interaction and
outcome of players, game theory can be a very useful domain to look for solutions.
Bargaining Theory
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to reach an agreement which describes the amount and time of energy exchange. As
described in Section 1.4, we require this agreement to be Pareto-optimal and fair. The
study of such problems is found in bargaining theory. Bargaining is a type of negotiation
where players bargain over some resource (energy in our case) to reach an agreeable
outcome.
Bargaining theory can be divided into two types, axiomatic bargaining and strategic
bargaining. Axiomatic bargaining associates the outcomes with certain axioms such as
Pareto-optimality and invariance to utility scales. In such bargaining, the emphasis is to
reach outcomes associated with axioms but not the process that is used to reach these
outcomes (Rubinstein, 1982). On the other hand, strategic bargaining emphasizes the
bargaining process and strategies used in bargaining. The uniqueness and existence of
an outcome is guaranteed, subjected to some requirements such as the nite number of
players, complete information. Rubinstein's bargaining model is an example of strategic
bargaining while the Nash bargaining solution is an example of axiomatic bargaining.
These two types of bargaining provide two extremely useful insights to our problem.
Firstly, using axiomatic bargaining, we can explore possible outcomes of our energy ex-
change problem which satisfy certain axioms. For example, we can use the axiomatic
approach to reach outcomes which can satisfy our requirements such as fairness and
Pareto-optimality as listed in Section 1.4. Secondly, we can investigate strategies and
protocols that can be used in bargaining for energy. For example, we can explore strate-
gies which can reduce or eliminate the eect of false reporting, or which can guarantee
a solution before the deadline. The former is called robustness and later is called time-
liness, two of our requirements as listed in Section 1.4.
Although the above approaches seem very promising, there are challenges in using them
for our problem. For example, axiomatic bargaining assumes that players are truthful in
revealing their information which may not be the case in our settings. Also, axiomatic
bargaining involves the role of a central mediator who computes the bargaining out-
come given the preferences and disagreement values of the players (see Section 2.3.2).
This central component can be dicult to implement where participants are part of a
decentralized systems such as peer-to-peer networks. On the other hand, in strategic
bargaining where players make counter-oers to reach an agreement, it can be complex
to compute the counter-oer in some cases where more than one issue is under consid-
eration, as in the problem of energy exchange (see Section 2.3). Therefore, although
bargaining provides a good starting point to explore bargaining for energy exchange,
there is no o-the-shelf bargaining solution for it at present.
Peer-to-Peer Energy Networks
As we mentioned earlier, the houses are connected to each other to form an energy
network. In a traditional energy network (such as the grid or the natural gas distribution
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(e.g. a step-down transformer) and energy ows in one direction, from the distribution
point to homes. On the contrary, in our model, the houses are connected directly to the
neighbouring houses via a physical link and the energy ows in both direction during
energy exchange. The exchange is not required to be between xed participants. i.e. a
house is allowed to exchange energy with any other house on the network. Also, there
is no central authority.
Such attributes of our model can be modeled using a peer-to-peer (P2P) architecture. A
P2P system is a distributed network architecture where participants share or exchange
their resources with others. These attributes the P2P architecture a natural choice to
connect houses in an energy network. Also, a participant in a P2P network can share
resources with any other participant of its choice and form an ad-hoc network, i.e. a
temporarily network. After the exchange, the participants are free to form another
network with any other participants of their choice. This is relevant to our model where
a energy controller can negotiate for an energy exchange with other energy controllers
of its choice and, if negotiation succeed, establish a link for exchange. The idea of a P2P
energy network is not novel. Amoretti (2009) describes exchange of energy in terms of
hydrogen distribution in a peer-to-peer network while Beitollahi and Deconinck (2007)
review dierent peer-to-peer topologies that can be used in a decentralized network of
distributed generation. However, their ideas are preliminary at this stage and do not
address many aspects of energy exchange in the P2P networks. For example, Amoretti
(2009) assumes that there is a virtual network already in place where hydrogen can be
bought and sold by houses. This can be thought of a market place where a peer can
search for another peer to buy or sell hydrogen. These peers can then establish a direct
connection. This assumption of simplifying the process to look for a peer, induces a
central component in the network, and thus, this approach may not be applicable in
pure P2P networks. On the other hand, Beitollahi and Deconinck (2007) discusses the
advantages of dierent network overlays, i.e. description of how peers are connected,
in a network of distributed generation. However, they do not discuss how peers would
interact or engage in negotiation to agree an energy exchange.
It is surprising to see that, though the vision of P2P energy network is shared by many
projects 5, there is no comprehensive research which empirically studies a P2P energy
network. More specically, we are not aware of any study focused on the P2P energy
networks of houses.
Utility Scale Energy Exchange
Energy exchange is a common practice in utility companies, particularly in electric com-
panies. Usually, this exchange is facilitated by means of a xed-surcharge, side-payments
or barter (see Section 2.4). Since we are interested in exchange without payments, or
barter as referred to as in electric companies (Ruusunen, 1994b), we nd Ehtamo and
Rusuunen's work (Ehtamo et al., 1989b, 1987; Ruusunen et al., 1991) related to our
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problem of energy exchange between houses. Ehtamo and Rusunnen's idea is to use
energy barter to improve overall system utility. They assume group of utility companies
each owning a generator. The cost of energy generation for a company varies over the
course of a day and it is dierent for each company. This disparity allows energy ex-
change to be benecial to all. Rusunnen and Ehtamo use axiomatic bargaining to ensure
fairness in such exchanges. Their settings are dierent from our problem in two respects.
Firstly, their model is focused on utility-level exchange and therefore the energy storage,
load deferral and uncertainty in renewable energy generation is not considered. Sec-
ondly, they assume that all participants reveal their true cost and utility function and
these can be audited to veracity whereas this is not the case in our problem.
1.5 Research Objective
Thus, against this background, our main research objective is to develop a solution for
a fair and optimal energy exchange between houses. More specically, our objective is:
 To develop an interaction-mechanism to enable fair and optimal energy exchange
between houses via decentralized negotiation. This solution must withstand mis-
reporting from selsh agents and be able to incorporate uncertainty in the energy
generation. In addition, the solution must be applicable to a small microgrid.
1.6 Research Contributions
As a rst step towards addressing our research objective, we have developed a prelim-
inary model of two neighbouring houses. These houses have energy controllers which
are represented as intelligent agents. These agents have some means of renewable en-
ergy generations (one has a solar panel while other has a wind turbine) and batteries
to store it. Both agents have non-identical load, power, and preferences proles and are
connected to each other by an electric cable which has a nite load capacity.
At this stage, we assume a mediator between the houses. We assume that both agents
truthfully reports their generation, load, preference, utility function and battery infor-
mation to the mediator which then decides an energy exchange via the Nash bargaining
solution. This solutions oers agents more utility than if they work individually. We
would like to use this model as a benchmark to see how well agents can perform when
they bargain via strategic bargaining.
A detailed and technical discussion of this model can be found in chapter 3 of this report.Chapter 1 Introduction 14
1.7 Structure of the report
The remainder of the report is organized as follows:
- In chapter 2, we discuss related literature and research carried out in this domain. We
look at the research discussing advantages of smart grid, micro-generation, micro-grid
and smart houses. We also discussed negotiation and bargaining techniques that have
been employed to solve similar problems.
- In Chapter 3, we discuss technical details of our model along with the experiments
carried out. We discuss the bargaining solution in general and Nash bargaining solution
in particular and why it is appropriate in our problem. We also discuss the challenges
in our optimization objective.
- In Chapter 4, we summarize our ndings and outline our future research direction.Chapter 2
Literature Review
In this chapter we review the existing literature related to our area of research. We
begin with the technologies that enable energy generation and storage in a house. Agent-
based energy management systems and bargaining solutions are discussed next. We then
discuss the present energy exchange solutions. Finally, we discuss literature focused on
P2P energy systems.
2.1 Enabling Technologies
In this section, we discuss two technologies that are very important for our vision of
energy exchange between houses to be feasible. Firstly, we discuss microgeneration in
houses and secondly the energy storage in houses.
2.1.1 Microgeneration
As we stated in Section 1.1, microgeneration is dened as the small-scale production of
heat and/or electricity from a low carbon source. Generally, it refers to on-site genera-
tion of energy by renewable energy resources or combined heat and power (CHP) units
(Abu-Sharkh et al., 2006). The literature points to many obvious advantages of micro-
generation. The distributed nature of renewable energy sources such as wind, sunlight
and waves makes microgeneration a natural choice. Besides this, microgeneration oers
a number of advantages over centralized or large-scale generation. For example, the heat
that is generated as a by-product during electricity generation can be used for the pur-
pose of space-heating. Microgeneration also eliminates the need to transfer energy and
thus avoids the transmission losses. Microgeneration equipment such as wind turbines,
solar panels and CHP units are extremely reliable and need little maintenance. The
energy produced is greener and the demand can be met eciently. Though microgener-
ation can be integrated with existing grid or the future smart grid, it is possible to run
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it in standalone mode (i.e. the o-grid mode). This increases the reliability in case of
grid failure.
Microgeneration has been estimated to be capable of providing 30-40% of UK electricity
needs by 2050 (Energy Saving Trust. et al., 2005). The UK government launched a
microgeneration strategy in 2006 to make microgeneraton a realistic alternative 1. There
has been good signs of progress, with the number of microgeneration units installed,
reported to be more than 100,000 (BERR, 2008b).
The maximum power that can be generated by a microgeneration unit in a house depends
on several factors such as the type of the equipment, fuel type and size. For example,
in case of wind turbines the maximum power produced depends on the design, blade
lengths, height from the ground and turbine eciency. Thus, domestic wind turbines
range from 400W to 5kW 2 (Bahaj et al., 2007). In case of micro-CHP, units with
maximum power of 15 kW are categorized as domestic micro-CHP units (Dentice et al.,
2003) and for solar panels, an average output is 8 kW (MacKay, 2007, p. 40).
To give a perspective for comparison, an average UK person needs 18 kWh energy per
day for electrical appliances (MacKay, 2007, p. 204).
2.1.2 Energy Storage Devices
In Section 1.2 we mentioned that the energy use can be optimized by using an energy
storage device. Energy can be stored in many forms but we focus on technologies that
can be utilized on a domestic scale. In general, energy storage devices at homes are
reported to be electric batteries and thermal storage (see DTI (2004)).
Generally, an energy storage device is assessed in two terms, storage capacity and power.
Storage capacity refers to the total amount of energy that can be stored in the device
while power is the charging and discharging rate of the energy from/to the device.
Storage capacity can be measured in kilo-watt-hour (kWh) which is the amount of energy
stored when a 1 kW power is applied to a battery for 1 hour. The charging/discharging
rate or power of a battery is the rate of ow of energy. We measure it in kW.
The storage capacity and the discharging rate depends on a number of factors. For
example, in a ow-cell battery, it may depend on the underlying chemical reaction, the
nature of chemical reaction, the amount of chemicals or even the size and design of a
battery. Therefore, it diers from device to device. Electrical storage devices for homes
may have capacities between 5kWh to 10kWh with 1-3kW power(DTI, 2004, p. 9). If
electric vehicles are used for this storage, it could be up to 50 kWh with 20-50kW power
(DTI, 2004, p. 9). Modern vehicles such as the Tesla Roadster from Tesla Motors, the
1http : ==www:decc:gov:uk=en=content=cms=uksupply=renewable=microgen=microgen:aspx
2Some domestic wind turbines are listed here at renewableUK -
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E6 from BYD and the Zhong Tai from Zotya are examples of vehicles with a battery
pack of 50 kWh. The storage capacity of these are comparable to the average demand
of 40 kWh per day per person for transportation (MacKay, 2007, p. 204). However,
given the interest in electric vehicles and the number of on-going projects, the storage
capacity is bound to increase while cost to go down. In fact, it has been estimated to
go down to 65% from 2009 to 2020 (BCG, 2010).
2.2 Agent-Based Energy Resource Management
Multiagent systems have been studied and applied in a variety of domains ranging from
information systems to the semantic web (Wooldridge and Jennings, 1995; Wooldridge
et al., 1996; Weiss, 1999; Jennings et al., 1998). Its application in the control and
management of energy resources has received considerable interest since 1990. This
trend is evident from a number of publication and projects in that period where the
focus is to apply the multiagent paradigm to distributed systems (see Georgakarakou
and Economides (2006)).
In the next sections, we discuss how multiagent knowledge has been applied to energy
domain. We observe that the central aim is to conserve energy either by having a
single intelligent agent to control energy consumption or by agent coordination and
resource allocation in multiagent systems. We also observe that the literature on agent
coordination is focused on energy conservation or energy markets.
2.2.1 Single Agent Systems for Energy Resource Management
Inspired by the control theory, agents have been used to control multiple energy re-
sources in a building. In such cases, a single agent in responsible for controling power
appliances and environment in a building, (for a survey Georgakarakou and Economides
(2006)). Early literature on agents in energy resource management can be divided into
two categories. Firstly, the literature where the focus is on automation of appliances for
example, control of lights and environment in a building. Secondly, where the focus is on
optimization via automation. Here, the same automation techniques are used to switch
on and o devices to optimize some criteria, usually to save energy. Such buildings are
referred to as intelligent buildings or IBs (Abras et al., 2010).
The more recent literature on energy management using single agents mostly addresses
smart houses. A Smart house is modeled as an agent controling energy appliances. In
this context, the smart house is a trimmed down version of intelligent buildings. The
objectives are the same, to control appliance intelligently to optimize some goals, for
example, cutting back the energy bills or reducing carbon footprints. The term smart
house can be traced back to 1984 when the National Association for Home BuildersChapter 2 Literature Review 18
in USA formed the Smart Houses group to push for the necessary technology to wire
houses for home automation (Aldrich, 2003).
Figure 2.1: A smart house. Source - Energy Saving Trust
A single agent can make use of energy more eciently using any or a combination of
the following techniques:
1. Automation of appliances
Energy use is automated so that it is used only when it is needed. For example,
controlling lights or space-heating based on the presence of persons in a room.
This solution needs the least intelligence but can be very eective where human
intervention is not reliable, e.g. a public building (see Sharples et al. (1999)).
2. Storage-based solutions
The main idea is to store energy when it is cheaper or not needed and then use
it later. In this way, agents can avoid buying energy when its expensive or reduce
carbon emissions by using energy when it is clean (Vytelingum et al., 2010).
3. Load-deferral solutions
Here the loads are deferred or delayed to carry out when the energy is cheaper
or cleaner. This diers from storage-based solutions where loads may be non-
deferrable. (see Vytelingum et al. (2010)).
The ecient use of the energy resources is, at its core, an optimization problem. The
general approach is to identify the objective function (which is mostly to minimize the
cost but can be any other criteria such as carbon emission) and the relevant constraints.
Then this problem is transformed into an optimization problem and solved with a suit-
able optimization technique. The optimization techniques in such problems range from
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In cases where energy generation or demand is exible or uncertain, machine learning
techniques can be applied to nd an appropriate solution (Hagras et al., 2003; Sharples
et al., 1999). These ML techniques help to establish beliefs about the environment and
make informed decision and consequently more ecient energy use.
Apart from houses and buildings, the single agent systems has also been used to con-
trol micro-grids and distributed resources (Chatzivasiliadis et al., 2008; Dimeas and N.,
2004). The main idea remains similar to that behind the intelligent building, i.e. to
optimize energy use given some loads and energy generation resources.
2.2.2 Multiagent Systems for Energy Resource Management
A multiagent system is a natural extension of a single agent system. A signicant amount
of literature has applied the multiagent paradigm to the energy management problem.
While the focus of a single agent system is the ecient use of energy via control of
energy resources by a single agent, the focus in multiagent systems is the ecient use of
energy via agent interactions. Coordination, negotiation and coalition are examples of
such interactions.
Before indulging further into discussion, we describe a common approach in the domain
of energy management for using energy eciently. In many scenarios, it is assumed that
reducing demand peak can help to use energy resources more eectively and can bring
the price of energy down. For example in terms of electricity, the price of electricity
generation increases rapidly after a certain threshold is reached as more expensive gen-
erators are switched on to meet this demand. Figure 2.2 shows this threshold to be 40
GW for the UK national grid. If this peak in demand is somehow reduced then elec-
tricity generation can be cheaper which is good for the suppliers and consumers. One
way of doing it is to spread the demand across the day to avoid daily peaks. This is
also referred to as attening the demand curve. Many papers target this approach from
dierent multi-agent techniques. Here, we focus on three aspects such as negotiation,
coordination and coalition.
Negotiation is the process of reaching an outcome via arguing. In multiagent systems
for energy management, negotiation can be used between agents for load balancing i.e.
to reduce peaks in demands (Brazier et al., 2002; Pra ca et al., 2008). Agents negotiate
with other agents to reach an outcome where demands are spread in nearly uniform
distribution to avoid peaks. However, these negotiation are price-based negotiation and
are not applicable in payment-free settings.
Coordination is another multiagent technique that can be used for the same purpose
of using energy eciently. Coordination is a problem of managing inter-dependencies
between the activities of agents (Wooldrige, 2009). Based on coordination, we can divide
multiagent systems into three categories. Firstly, a full-cooperative multiagent systemChapter 2 Literature Review 20
Figure 2.2: Energy Demand against the generation cost. Each cross represent a
half-hour reading. Source - Vytelingum et al. (2010)
where agents are seless and have a common goal. The cooperation is explicit as agents
cooperate to maximize overall system utility. Secondly, a cooperative system where
agents are selsh and interested in achieving their personal goals. In these games, co-
operation is not explicit; agents cooperate only when it leads to better utility for them.
Thirdly, a non-cooperative system is a multiagent system where agents are strictly com-
petitive.
In cooperative systems where agents are selsh, coordination emerges when agents in-
teract while pursuing their self-interest (Searle, 1983; Wooldrige, 2009, p. 79-111, 116).
Searle gives an example of people running towards a tree when it suddenly rains to de-
scribe coordination in self-interested agents. This type of emergent cooperation is also
evident in Vytelingum's work (Vytelingum et al., 2010). In this work, selsh agents
store electricity when the demand is not high and thus electricity is cheap. However,
when they all attempt to store simultaneously, demands increases rapidly driving prices
up. Thus, these agents learn not to store electricity in a synchronized manner. In other
words, a cooperation emerges whereby demand peaks are kept lower. This is an im-
plicit result of selsh agents interacting with each other, they have no intentions and no
communications to cooperate.
Li et al. (2010) identies the following four types of coordination approaches for the
management of energy resources along with their merits and demerits.
1. Price-Based Control
Consumers' energy appliances are controlled indirectly by asking the human owner
of the resources to respond to a varying price. Thus, at peak-times the price
could be set high to motivate owners to reduce consumption. Owners reduce
their consumption for their own benets and an overall reduction in peak reduces
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coordination leads an ecient use of energy. Pitfalls are dependence on the human
owners who may not be available sometimes or even not exists for some resources
(Hopper et al., 2007).
2. Direct Load Control
Using special equipment, consumers appliances can be directly controlled and can
be switched on or o when needed by the energy suppliers. The savings are passed
onto consumers based on their level of participation.3 Demerits are insensitive
intervention in the operation of appliance which may cause inconvenience some-
times. Some companies may consult the human owner before switching appliances
on or o but this approach introduces the problems discussed above.
3. Market-Based Control
Agent-based, market-oriented algorithms are used where a broker agent negoti-
ates with resource agents to x usage and price (Kamphuis et al., 2006; Carlsson
and Andersson, 2005). This can involve virtual or real money or tokens. This
approach has two scalability problems. First in terms of number of players and
secondly regarding the interdependency in the participants' demand over time.
One commercial implementation of this approach is PowerMatcher. 4 It is a
market mechanism where energy resources are allocated via auctions.
4. Planning Algorithms
A number of planning algorithms to induce explicit coordination in agents have
been proposed (Clement and Barrett, 2003; Muller et al., 2001). These algorithms
can be divided into centralized or decentralized and long-term or short-terms algo-
rithm based on the architecture and scope of optimization. However, it has been
identied that there are two types of issues with such algorithms (Li et al., 2010).
Firstly, the lack of scalability in terms of number of resources. Secondly, there
is no room for adaptation and thus the lack of ability to respond to unexpected
events.
The nal approach is the coalition approach where agents form a coalition to be able to
get a better deal (Hamalainen et al., 2000). Here a group of agents coordinate to use
energy. This coordination may involve negotiation and/or cooperation for ecient use
of energy within the group. This approach provides a good way of reducing energy cost
within a group, however the overall eect on the system is not mentioned.
Up to this point, we have summed up all the contemporary multiagent techniques applied
to energy resource management domain. One noticeable point is the fact that all of these
approaches are price-based mechanisms. We also notice that there is no published work
on the idea of energy exchange in multiagent system for energy eciency. As we stated
3For example: http://www.energex.com.au/environment/energy_efficiency.html
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in the last chapter, we can use bargaining theory for the energy exchange in multiagent
systems. In the following section, we explore literature on bargaining theory, particularly
bargaining solutions that can be used for energy exchange.
2.3 Bargaining
Generally speaking, bargaining refers to the process through which a seller and buyer
reach an agreement. Also, the negotiation over dividing the result of a cooperation
between participants is also called bargaining. Bargaining is a very well studied topic
in game theory and consequently there have been many bargaining solutions proposed
(Muthoo, 1999; Mas-Colell et al., 1995). We next dene the bargaining problem and
discuss related concepts in the following paragraph.
Denition 1: Bargaining Problem
In cooperative game theory, a bargaining problem refers to the problem of selecting an
appropriate solution from a solution set. The solution set is the set of all feasible solutions
or agreements. An appropriate solution is a solution with some desired properties. This
solution is called a bargaining solution. A Pareto-solution is the solution where one
player can not improve her utility without making any other player worse o. The set
of all such solutions describes the Pareto-frontier of a bargaining problem.
A bargaining solution can also refer to the method used to reach this solution. Through-
out this report, the same term will be used for both the solution and the method,
however, the context will reveal the nature of use.
2.3.1 Characteristics of Bargaining Problems
The type of a bargaining problem can vary depending on the number of issues or the
type of issues involved. Below we discuss these characteristics.
 Single-issue bargaining v/s multi-issue bargaining
When the subject under consideration is a single issue, then the bargaining is
called single issue bargaining. The opposite is multi-issue bargaining. Here, issue
does not refer to the number of items and therefore, the single-issue negotiation
does not necessarily refer to bargaining over a single item. For example, bargaining
over the energy price could be regarded as a single issue bargaining if price of the
energy is the only concern. However, when other issues such as time and power
are under consideration too then it is a multi-issue bargaining. Also, when the
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case of multi-issue bargaining as the issues under consideration (i.e. the number
of energy exchanges) are multiple.
 Divisible goods v/s indivisible goods
A good is divisible if it can be divided into smaller parts. For example, a cake is
a divisible goods while a vehicle is not. In context of energy, energy is divisible
as any given amount of energy can be divided into smaller parts. For example,
10kWh of energy can be divided into 10 smaller parts, each of 1 kWh. Sometimes,
a small xed amount of a divisible goods is assumed to be indivisible for bargaining
to proceed more easily. For example, 1kWh may be considered to be an indivisible
unit in our case.
 Independent issues v/s dependent issues
In multi-issue bargaining, issues may or may not be independent of each other.
An example is the bargaining for a x amount of energy for two hours. If the
energy is required to watch two unrelated hour-long programs on TV, then the
issues (energy in each hour) can be considered to be independent as watching the
second program does not depend on whether energy was secured for the rst hour.
On the other hand, if this power is required to power an oven for two hours to bake
a dish, then these issues are dependent as the energy is required in both hours to
cook the dish properly.
The type of the bargaining issues play a signicant role in selection and complexity of
bargaining solutions proposed in literature. For example, bargaining over single issues
which are independent and divisible is easier than indivisible, interdependent multi-issue
bargaining (Wooldrige, 2009, p. 316).
Apart from the type of issues, the choice of bargaining solution also depends on how
players interact with each other. For example, if bargainers solve the dispute by oer
and counter-oer proposals, then it is said to be strategic bargaining. On the other
hand, if bargainers interact via a mediator or arbiter which sets several axioms and then
nds a bargaining solution for them, then it is said to be axiomatic bargaining. Here,
in the following paragraph, we discuss both approaches in detail.
2.3.2 Axiomatic Bargaining
Apart from the number, type or relationship of bargaining issues, a signicant part of the
bargaining literature is focused on the optimality and fairness of bargaining solutions.
The notion of optimality in bargaining refers to Pareto-optimality, described below.
However, there is no agreed denition of a fair solution (Binmore, 2009; Bereby-Meyer
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characteristics of the outcome, i.e. some criteria that the solution should meet. For
example, in game theory the problem of dividing goods amongst players is called fair
division (Brams and Taylor, 1996). Here, fairness criteria can be the exact division, envy-
free division or proportional division (see Brams and Taylor (1996) for a full discussion).
Thus, some division of goods are associated with having some or all of these properties.
In this sense, players may agree on a division given that it has certain agreed properties.
In the context of bargaining theory and multiagent systems, the bargaining outcome or
solution is reached in a similar way. Given a set of bargaining outcomes, some solutions
are associated with having certain properties or axioms. This kind of bargaining is
referred to as the axiomatic bargaining (Nash, 1953; Roth, 1979).
Before discussing the axiomatic bargaining solutions, we list the most common axioms
found in literature (see Roth (1977) for a comprehensive list):
1. Invariance to equivalent utility representation
This axiom is also known as invariance to ane transformation or scale-freeness.
This refers to the characteristics that the bargaining outcome should be invariant
to how each agent values its share. In other words, rescaling an agent utility should
not change the bargaining solution.
2. Pareto-Optimality
This axiom means that the solution can not be improved in any particular direc-
tion without making another player's payo worse. In other words, no agent can
improve its utility without making another agent's worse.
3. Symmetry
The solution should depend only on the utility function of agents, not on the
identity of agents. In other words, symmetric utility functions should result in
symmetric payos.
4. Independence from irrelevant alternatives
This axiom states that if a certain choice A is preferred over B in a choice set S
then inclusion of another choice C, must not make B preferable to A.
In the next sections, we discuss some axiomatic bargaining solutions and discuss the
axioms they satisfy.
2.3.2.1 Nash Bargaining Solution
In cooperative game theory, the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) (Nash, 1950, 1953) is a
solution to the two-player bargaining game. Each player has a personal value, i.e. utility,
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value which represents their utility if no cooperation takes place (i.e. when players fail
to reach an agreement).
Assuming two players A and B, the set of all solutions is a plane while the set of feasible
solutions S is a subset, or graphically, a subplane within this plane. The subplane S
has the pair of disagreement values (da;db) as one vertex and Nash assumes this set
to be compact5 and convex.6 Any point (ua;ub) in the set S describes the individual
shares of agents and since agents will only cooperate if they get more utility then their
disagreement values, therefore (da;db)  (ua;ub).
If x and y are the shares of agent A and B respectively, then the Nash bargaining
solution is obtained by
argmax
x;y
[ua(x)   ua(da)]  [ub(y)   ub(db)] (2.1)
where x;y and denotes shares of A and B respectively and da;db are the disagreement
value of agents A and B respectively. The solution to equation 2.1 (i.e. the values of
x and y which maximizes this equation) are the shares of agents A and B respectively.
Equation 2.1 is also called the Nash Product. If the feasible solution set S is convex and
compact then this solution to this equation is unique (see Nash (1953) for the proof).
Figure 2.3 provides a good illustration of the Nash bargaining product.
The Nash bargaining solution satises all the axioms dened in the last section.
2.3.2.2 Utilitarian Solution
The utilitarian solution in cooperative game theory is used to divide a shared utility
between two or more players. If (x;y) shows the shares of agent A and B, (ua;ub) are
the utilities, and (da;db) are the disagreement values respectively, then we nd the point
which maximizes the following equation.
argmax
x;y
[ua(x) + ub(y)] (2.2)
The utilitarian solution satises the axioms 2, 3 and 4, failing the rst axiom in Sec-
tion 2.3.2 of invariance to equivalent utility representation. This can pose a problem in
situation where agents have considerable dierence in their utility functions because the
utilitarian solution will give the goods to the agent which values it the most and the
other agents will get no share. Thus, though it maximizes the overall group utility by
5A set is compact if it is closed and bounded.
6A set C is convex if for all x and y in C and all t in the interval [0;1], the point (1  t)x+t(y) is in
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giving the goods to the agent which has high utility for them, it can be argued whether
it is a fair solution.
2.3.2.3 Egalitarian Solution
The egalitarian solution attempts to grant equal payo to both players. It proposes that
in a given feasible solution space S, solving the following equation will divide the shared
utility equally between two players (Mas-Colell et al., 1995):
(ua(x)   da) = (ub(y)   db) (2.3)
Here x;y;ua;ub and da;db are the shares, utilities and disagreement values of players A
and B respectively.
The egalitarian solution satises the axioms 2, 3 and 4. Since it satises the same axioms
as the utilitarian solution does, it is hindered by the same problem discussed in the last
section.
2.3.2.4 Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution
The fourth axiom (independence from irrelevant alternatives) has been a topic of con-
troversy as it has been described as a very restrictive axioms for a solution (Roth, 1977).
This property describes that if two players prefer a solution in a solution set S then they
must prefer the same solution in a subset of S (Mas-Colell et al., 1995). However, it has
been shown that adhering to this axioms may make some players worse o when the so-
lution set is reduced (Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975). The Kalai Smorodinsky bargaining
solution (Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975) is an extension to the Nash bargaining solution
which does not conform to this axiom, instead it introduces an alternative axioms called
monotonicity, as dened below:
5. Axiom of Monotonicity
For every utility level that player 1 may demand, the maximum feasible utility
level that player 2 can simultaneously reach is increased, then the utility level
assigned to player 2 according to the solution should also be increased (Kalai and
Smorodinsky, 1975).
To compute the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, we need to form a rectangle in the solution
space S. The rectangle is formed such that one point is the set of disagreement values
(da;db). The other point is the the maximum utility that the rst player can make, i.e.
ua
= max(ua : (ua;ub)) 2 S denoted as ua
. The third point is the maximum utilityChapter 2 Literature Review 27
for the second player i.e. ub
= max(ub : (ua;ub)) 2 S. Given that three points of the
rectangle are known, the last point is just the intersection of projections, one from point
ua
in the direction of ub and the other from the point ub
in the direction of ua. We
call this point (x;y). Then a line is sketched from the point (da;db) to (ua
;ua
). The
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is the point where it intersects the Pareto-frontier, as shown
in Figure 2.3.













Figure 2.3: Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution. The solid line is the
Pareto-frontier. The origin is taken as the disagreement point (i.e. (da;db) = (0;0)),
thus all the acceptable agreement must lie above this point. This region is called the
feasible region and any point in it shows the player utility, i.e. (ua;ub). The dashed line
represents the Nash product of the players utility (i.e. (ua ub) since (da;db) = (0;0)).
Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution (K-S) is the dashed-dotted line. The maximum
utility that agent A can get is at the point (1;0) while the maximum utility for agent
B is at (0;1). Thus, ua

= max(ua : (ua;ub)) = 1 ua






) shows the maximum utilities of agent A and B which is the end point
of K-S line. The K-S solution lies at the point where this line intersects Pareto-frontier.
The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution has shown to be a good choice when the fourth axioms
(independence from irrelevant alternatives) is not important (see Roth (1979) for a
discussion and examples). Apart from this, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution satises the
axioms 2, 3 and 4 and the additional axiom 5.
2.3.3 Strategic bargaining Model
Seminal work in strategic bargaining theory is Rubinstein's dividing pie problem (Ru-
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reach an agreement on the partition of a pie of 1. Both players make oers and counter-
oers to suggest how it should be divided. When a player makes an oer, the other
player must either accept it or reject it and continue with the bargaining. Rubinstein
assumes that players have complete information and can make unlimited alternating
oers. It is further assumed that the delays are costly for both parties.
Rubinstein's bargaining process can be modeled as a dynamic game and solved by using
the backward induction method. The general idea of the backward induction method is
to determine the optimal strategy of the player who makes the last move of the game.
Then, the optimal action of the next-to-last moving player is determined taking the last
player's action as given. The process continues in this way backwards in time, until it
determines the Nash equilibrium of each subgame of the original game.
There are many dierent variations of the Rubinstein's model (see Binmore (1992) for an
overview). Examples include the models with risk of breakdown, incomplete information
or with a time deadline. As mentioned in Section 1.5 the ultimate goal of our research is
to develop a software-based solution where agents can negotiate to each other directly by
making oers for energy exchange. In relation to our model, the Rubinstein's bargaining
model provides a good opportunity to investigate the strategic interaction of agents.
However, the seemingly easy task of computing counter-oers can be very complex. For
this reason, the Rubinstein's model has been applied to simple settings until now.
2.3.4 Which bargaining solution is appropriate for the energy exchange
problem?
We have discussed utilitarian, egalitarian, the Nash bargaining and the Kalai-Smorodinsky
models in the above sections. Each model has its own properties and satises some of
the axioms dened above. The question here is whether each of these models is appli-
cable in the energy exchange. This question can be answered by analyzing the required
properties of our solution listed in Section 1.4. In particular, we note that one prop-
erty requires the solution to energy exchange problem to withstand the eect of false
reporting. Though there can be many ways of reporting false information, one way is to
report exaggerated utility for a given energy allocation. An appropriate solution must
withstand this eect and it should not let an agent inuence the outcome in its favour
by reporting a false utility function. In other words, the solution should be irrelevant
to utility representation of the agents or more precisely, irrelevant to equivalent utility
representation which is our rst axiom listed in Section 2.3.2. Thus, all the solutions
which do not conform to the rst axiom are exploitable. This leaves only the Nash bar-
gaining solution as it satises all four axioms. Indeed, it is the only bargaining solution
which satises all four axioms (Roth, 1979). Therefore, in the energy sharing problem
where selsh agents need to reach a solution, the Nash bargaining solution is the most
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The discussion so far focuses on the two players games and the obvious question is
whether the Nash bargaining solution is applicable in multi-player games. Indeed, ex-
tension of the Nash bargaining to multi-player scenario has been shown to be robust and
straightforward (Waslander et al., 2003; Sang-Chul and Wen, 2006; Ruusunen, 1994b)
which again conrms the appropriateness of the Nash bargaining solution in energy
exchange problem.
However, one key requirement of our model which is to enable agents to negotiate directly
to each other can not be modeled using the Nash bargaining solution. Nash bargaining
solution is an axiomatic bargaining solution and it requires a mediator to which agents
can report. This mediator then computes a solution. The presence of a mediator makes
this process a centralized solution which is against our requirement. This leads us to
strategic bargaining where agents can negotiate directly. We note that the Rubinstein's
model can be a good choice. The standard Rubinstein's model can be extended to
include our requirements of timeliness, robustness and adaptability (Binmore, 1992)
which makes it a good choice for our problem. However, the Rubinstein's model cannot
always be solved as the standard model assumes full information. Also, as said earlier,
it can be computationally complex to compute the counter-oer.
2.4 Energy Exchange
In this section we summarize the literature on energy exchange. Most of the literature
can be divided into two categories based on whether fairness is a criterion in the solution.
Thus, one category deals with energy exchange which is purely cooperative and where
fairness is not a criterion. In such systems, the objective is to maximize overall system
utility, i.e. a utilitarian approach. These problems arise frequently in systems where all
agents have a common goal. Examples are power management on a naval ship where
dierent components coordinate and exchange power to conserve power (Ganesh, 2005)
or intelligent buildings where dierent agents coordinate to reduce peak (Abras et al.,
2010; Davidsson and Boman, 2000). Since the overall performance, not fairness, is the
prime objective, these approaches are not feasible in our case.
The other part of the literature on energy exchange consider fairness criteria in some
respect. We can divide this literature into further four subcategories.
2.4.1 Fixed-surcharge energy exchange
As mentioned in the rst chapter, the energy cost varies with the demand. In some cases,
when energy exchange is to take place in periods where energy demand is dierent, an
extra amount of energy may be demanded to make this exchange even. For example,
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of energy, plus a predetermined additional compensation at night (Ruusunen et al.,
1991). In some countries, the same exchange method is employed for electricity exchange
between cities. Examples are India (New Dehli and Madhya Pradesh) 7 and Pakistan
(Karachi and Lahore)8.
2.4.2 Market-based energy exchange
Market-based environments are simulated by trade between multiple buyers and multiple
sellers (Carlsson and Andersson, 2005; Clearwater, 1996; Clement and Barrett, 2003).
Broadly speaking, it is an auction-based model where the sellers list the availability of
energy. The buyers then submit their bids for this energy. The highest bid wins the
auction and thus the buyer with the highest bid is allocated the energy. The roles of
seller and buyer are not permanent. For example, a buyer who has won multiple auctions
and has extra energy may become a seller to sell the extra energy.
A majority of contemporary approaches for energy exchange are market-based (examples
are Jia-hai et al. (2005); Gnansounou et al. (2004); Li et al. (2007)). Although, it is
sometimes referred to the energy exchange it is a market model and exchange takes place
in the form of money, not pure energy. Furthermore, in some cases this may be virtual
money (Li et al., 2010). Fairness is imposed by establishing a free market where buyers
and sellers can decide over price. A participant may walk away from an auction if she
feels the price is not fair.
Despite their popularity, market-based approaches does not provide us with a good
solution to the energy exchange in peer-to-peer networks. Firstly, market-based ap-
proaches involve currency and are not applicable in payment-free system. One way to
get around this problem is to use virtual money or tokens. However, perhaps what makes
market-based unseemly is the fact that all market-based approaches assume a central
entity which is responsible for maintaining the market or auctions and thus leading to
a centralized solution. Such centralized solutions are not applicable in decentralized
environments which is one the requirement (Section 1.4) in our problem.
2.4.3 Pure Barter
Energy barter refers to energy exchange where energy is the only medium of payment.
Energy is borrowed and an equivalent amount is returned later. This equivalence is
measured in some agreed way before the exchange (Ruusunen et al., 1991). The dif-
ference in xed-surcharge energy exchange dened above and energy barter is that in
energy barter there is no additional surcharge, instead the preference and demands for
the energy denes when two amount of energy are equivalent.
7Times of India, October 10, 2006
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Surprisingly, apart from Rusuunen's and Ehtamo's work (Ehtamo et al., 1987, 1989b,a,
1988; Ruusunen et al., 1989, 1991; Ruusunen, 1992, 1994b,a), this area has not been
much explored. Rusuunen's work provides a good basis for fair and optimal barter in
electricity exchange. In his proposed model, energy producers form a pool where barter
takes place to maximize cost savings. This saving is then divided between participants
using the Nash bargaining solution. These savings are recorded in terms of energy saved
and the exchange takes place in terms of electricity only; thus, a pure barter. Apart
from being a centralized solution, this work provides a good example for our problem.
2.4.4 Barter with side payments
This approach is a modied form of pure barter. Here, barter takes place in the form
of energy exchange, as mentioned above, but in cases where only energy exchange may
not be conceived as a fair solution, a side-payment is introduce to make up for someone
losses. Such approaches are again not applicable in payment-free settings.
We have summarized energy exchange methods in literature. Based on the nature of so-
lutions, energy exchange may or may not be required to be fair. We are interested in fair
solutions. However, the contemporary energy exchange approaches are either centralized
and/or payment based which make them improper in distributed and payment-free set-
tings. Energy barter, however, provides a window of opportunity and can be applicable
where distributed control and payment-free energy exchange.
2.5 Peer-2-Peer Energy Networks
As we mentioned earlier in Section 1.4, the idea of P2P energy networks is not novel but it
has not received the attention it deserves. Two references in literature are in hydrogen
distribution network (Amoretti, 2009) and in power grid (Beitollahi and Deconinck,
2007). Amoretti (2009) proposes that owners of distributed generation resources can
be connected in a peer-to-peer network and can buy and sell energy (hydrogen in this
case). He provides an overview of feasible network overlays schemes in such energy
networks. An overlay scheme denes how peers are connected and how messages are
propagated among nodes. Several overlay schemes such as unstructured, structured,
hierarchical schemes, in context of energy distribution, are discussed in this study. He
assumes that each peer is a consumer and as well as a producer of energy. When a peer
has some demands which it is unable to meet, it sends a message to the network which
is propagated by all peers to nd a peer which can provide energy. When found, the
price of the energy (including the transmission cost) is negotiated and then this peer
buys this energy.
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is in a preliminary stage and there are a couple of directions that must be explored
before it can be applied in real world. Firstly, it abstract away the negotiation details.
It is assumed that peers are able to negotiate over price and reach a decision. Also,
there is no study on how the message passing mechanism scales and how payments are
divided if two peers are connected through another peer and energy transfer involves
this peer.
Another study on the P2P energy networks by Beitollahi and Deconinck (2007) discusses
advantages of dierent network overlays schemes, in a network of distributed generation.
It advocates the idea of dissolving the traditional power grid into smaller distributed
units which can then exchange energy. Though, it promotes the idea of P2P energy
networks, it does not provide any details on implementation neither any empirical data.
The topic of P2P energy networks has yet to be studied comprehensively. In particular,
there is no study to explore energy exchange in houses.
2.6 Summary
Microgeneration and smart houses are the inevitable part of future vision of energy.
Given the intermittent nature of renewable energy resources and the need to integrate
distributed energy resources, energy exchange is a component of this vision. Energy
exchange between utility companies has been studied by Rusuunen, however, this work
is not applicable to our more general problem of energy exchange for two reasons. First,
it makes use of axiomatic concepts and thus assumes a centralized system. Second, it
does not consider energy storage or issues with renewable generation. In multiagent
systems, the idea of energy sharing has only been studied in terms of energy trading,
with most of the literature focused on market-based approaches. These approaches again
propose centralized systems which are not applicable in one-to-one energy exchange.
Axiomatic bargaining solutions are centralized and assumes that participants reveal
their true information which may not be the case when selsh agents are involved in
bargaining. Strategic bargaining models are decentralized and allow one-to-one bargain-
ing between selsh agents. However, it can be hard to use strategic models in real world
for two reasons. Firstly, some of them require players to have complete information,
e.g. Rubinstein's model. Secondly, it can be computationally complex for players to
compute oers and counter-oers in multi-issue negotiation.
Although, certain outcomes can be labelled as fair in axiomatic bargaining, strategic
bargaining models can not be measured on this criteria. However, a bargaining prob-
lem can be modeled using both axiomatic and strategic approaches to benchmark the
strategic approach against the axiomatic approach.Chapter 3
Cooperative Energy Barter in
Microgrids
As the rst step towards a decentralized bargaining solution for energy exchange, we
develop an axiomatic bargaining model. Axiomatic bargaining models, as we mentioned
earlier, are centralized which is against our requirements. However, the purpose of devel-
oping an axiomatic model is two-fold. First, we can identify the energy exchanges which
can said to be fair, based on some axiomatic criteria. Second, we can use the outcomes
from axiomatic bargaining to compare with the outcomes from strategic bargaining and
then benchmark the strategic approach against the axiomatic approach.
3.1 Problem Model
This section describes our model in detail along with the basic components and assump-
tions that we hold. We discuss the power generation, load, preference, utility, storage
and constraints in our model. We also show all the attributes and notations of our
model.
We begin with Figure 3.1 which shows a visual model of two houses connected together.
Each house has some microgeneration units (a solar panel and a wind turbine), a battery
and a house controller device (circles: A and B). A house controller device is responsible
for controlling all appliances, microgeneration units, battery and power ows in the
house.
We now discuss each prole and notation in detail.
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Figure 3.1: A visual description of the model.
3.1.1 Agents
As stated in Section 1.5, in our problem an agent represents the energy controller device
in a house. The house energy controller is assumed to have access and control of all
the microgeneration units and appliances in a house. Also, the controller has all the
information regarding a house such as the power generation, preference and load proles
which are described in the later sections.
3.1.2 Time periods
We divide a day into 24 discrete periods corresponding to 24 hours in a day. This leads
to three implications. First, the least amount of time for which an exchange can take
place is an hour. Second, the rate of energy exchange during this unit time remains
constant. For example, an exchange of 1 kWh energy for a single time period implies
that this exchange takes place in one hour and 1 kW was the power maintained during
the exchange. Third, all the proles are based on unit times. At this stage, this atomicity
is assumed to keep our model simple but at a later stage, we can relax these constraints.
A unit of time is denoted by t such that t 2 T where T is the set of all time unit and
jTj = 24.
An additional assumption regarding the time periods is that they are circularly linked,
i.e. the last time period of a day is connected to the rst time period of the next day
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3.1.3 Power Generation Prole
The energy generation prole for an agent shows the total generation capacity in a unit
time by the microgeneration units. We assume that the power in a unit time remains
constant. For example, a 5 kW entry in the power prole shows that the energy can be
generated at a constant rate of 5 kW for an hour. This assumption of constant power is
valid for two reasons. Firstly, the agent can use a combination of microgeneration units
(e.g. a micro-CHP with a wind turbine) to ensure a constant output. Secondly, this
assumption rules out the uncertainty associated with renewable energy resources and
thus, makes the modeling of our problem easier. We will model this uncertainty factor
in our future work.
Microgeneration units are characterized as low-power generators and we assume that
agents in our model have a maximum power generation capacity of 8 kW which is
available only in certain times of a day.
We denote the set of power generation as PG and pgt shows the generation at time t.
Since jTj = 24 therefore jPGj = 24. Also, since the time periods are linked, the prole
is repeatable (i.e. pg24+t = pgt).
3.1.4 Load Prole
Load prole shows the required power in each unit time. As with the power generation,
we assume energy consumption rate to be constant in a unit time. For example, a load
of 2 kW in a unit time corresponds to a constant requirement of 2 kW in that time unit
and the energy consumed is 2 kWh.
The load prole is represented by a set L and a member of this set is denoted by lt at
time t. Also, since the time periods are linked, the prole is repeatable (i.e. l24+t = lt).
3.1.5 Available Power Prole
Unlike the load prole which is a set of an agent's demands, the available power prole
is the set of the actual power available or allocated to an agent. For example, an agent
may need 10 kW power for a unit time (load) but gets 2 kW from a microgeneration
unit and 3 kW from a battery, a total of 5 kW power for that time unit; thus, 10 kW
is the required power or load while 5 kW is the available power for that time period.
Available power prole is represented by AP and apt is the available power at time t.
Also, this pro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3.1.6 Preference Prole
For every load per unit time, an agent has a preference. This shows the comparative
degree to which an agent regards this demand important. In other words, preference is
a function which associates the load lt at time t with a real number. The preferences are
assumed to be independent i.e. a preference for a single time period depends only on
that particular period and not on any other time period. For example, the preference to
watch an hour-long TV program in a given time period depends only on this time period.
This assumption of independent preferences reduces the complexity in computation. We
will consider interdependent issues later in our future work.
The preference prole is represented by P and pt denotes the preference at time t. Also,
since the time periods are linked, this prole is repeated for every day.
3.1.7 Utility Function
The utility function of an agent is a linear function which maps a member of the available
power prole to a real number. It is computed as the following:




subjected to 0  apt  lt, where ut is the utility of an agent at time t, pt is the
preference at time t, lt is the load at time t, apt is the available power at time t.
More specically, the utility of an agent at a particular time period is the percentage
of demand (load) met multiplied by the preference for that load. This implies that ut
can never be greater than pt, (i.e. ut  pt). Also, Equation 3.1 implies that when the
ratio between apt and lt equals 1 then ut is equal to pt and thus, the maximum utility
for a time slot is the preference for that time slot. Equation 3.1 also implies that the
ratio between apt and lt is never greater than one,(i.e.
apt
lt  1 ) since available power
should not exceed the load at any time. Also, since the preferences are assumed to be
independent, the overall utility is a linearly-additive function. 1 Therefore, the overall








1Let f : V ! R be a function on a real vector space V. We say that f is additive if f(x + y) =
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3.1.8 Battery Model
Although the current state of storage technologies make a 50kWh battery storage a valid
assumption as described in Section 2.1.2, for our model, we assume that each house has
a 30kWh energy storage capacity with a 5kW maximum charge and discharge rate.
This is more than current storage devices in homes, which are reported to be somewhere
between 5kWh to 10kWh with power ratings of 1-3kW power (see Section 2.1.2), for two
reasons. First, the current use of energy storage devices is limited in houses. Storage is
either used for stabilizing the intermittent renewable energy or for storing some energy
when it is cheaper (a storage heater is an example). This indicates that storage is not
being used to its full potential in houses. Second, in the near future, energy storage will
cost less and will be more appealing to people.
We denote the maximum capacity of this battery by B, i.e. B = 30kWh. Also, the
maximum rate of energy ow or power of the battery is denoted by Cr and Cr = 5kW.
Cr is assumed to be positive when charging and negative when the battery is discharged.
During operation, the dynamics of battery states can be dened by two variables. Firstly,
by the ow of energy in and out of the battery at each time slot. The rate of this energy
ow is measured in kW and we denote it with bft 2 BF where t is the time period and
BF is the set of battery ows. As the maximum ow at any given time is Cr, it implies
that  Cr  bft  +Cr. The second variable is the state of a battery describing the
amount of energy stored. It is measure in kWh, denoted by the set Q and a member in
this set is identied as qt where t is the time period. This implies that qt = 0 means that
the battery is not charged while qt = B shows that the battery is fully charged. Note
that 0  qt  B (i.e. the battery cannot store energy greater than its capacity and it
can only provide energy which has already been stored). Finally, as mentioned above in
Section 3.1.2, the last state of the battery is linked with the rst state of the next day,
i.e. q1 = q24 + bf24. These all attributes are modeled as constraints in our model.
3.1.9 Wasted Energy
There may be some cases where an agent is unable to use its full energy generation
capacity. For example, an agent may decide to miss or reduce some energy generation
opportunity when the battery is full and the load is already met. We want to model this
phenomenon to measure the amount of energy that could be generated but the agent
does not opt to due to the limited battery or low demand. We call this wasted energy
and denote it by a set W where each element wt denoted the amount of energy that was
not generated at time t. Since this waste comes from power generation only, the waste
at any time is always less than the generated power at that time, i.e. wt  pgt. Also,
since the time periods are linked, w24+t = wt.Chapter 3 Cooperative Energy Barter in Microgrids 38
3.1.10 Transmission Line
So far the discussion is around an agent, i.e. a single house. However, when we extend
our model to two agents, we need a transmission line and a regulator between these
agents. The transmission line is a physical link which can transfer power. The power on
transmission line is denoted by linkt at time t and it is positive or negative depending on
the direction of ow. The capacity of the transmission line to transfer power is denoted
by linkcap and it constant, i.e. linkcap = 5kW. Since the power on the transmission line
can never exceed the capacity of the transmission line therefore linkt  linkcap where
linkt 2 R.
3.1.11 Regulator
In order to regulate energy ow between houses and to facilitate negotiations, we require
a regulator between houses. Agents who wish to participate in an energy exchange send
the details of their proles and utility functions to the regulator who then computes an
optimal and fair energy exchange solution.
3.1.12 Summary of the Model
We now present a review of all sets and notations we used so far in our model in Table 3.1.
Name Type Notation Notation for Value/
an element Boundary
Time periods Set T t 1  t  24
Power Generation Prole Set PG pgt 0  pgt  8
Load Prole Set L lt 0  lt
Available Power Prole Set AP apt 0  apt  lt
Preference Prole Set P pt 0  pt
Battery States Set Q qt 0  qt  B
Transmission Power Set Link linkt  linkcap  linkt  linkcap
Waste Set W wt 0  wt  pgt
Utility Function Function u ut 0  ut  pt
Storage Capacity Constant B - 30 kWh
Battery Charging rate Constant C+
r - 5 kW
Battery Discharging rate Constant C 
r - 5 kW
Transmission Capacity Constant linkcap - 5 kW
Table 3.1: An overview of the model attributes and notation.Chapter 3 Cooperative Energy Barter in Microgrids 39
3.2 Optimal Energy Use Without Energy Exchange
In this section, we discuss an optimization approach where energy exchange is not an
option. In such case, the prime objective is to allocate the available power to meet
demand on time. This allocation is computed so that the overall utility is maximized.
Demands are prioritized based on the associated utility and the demands with higher
preferences are met rst. We give an example of such optimization in the section below.









































































Figure 3.2: Power, load and preference prole of the agent.
Suppose an agent has some microgeneration units and a battery. This agent has a power,
load and preference prole as shown in Figure 3.2. The data here is synthetic and it is
based on our literature review (see Enabling Technologies - Section 2.1).
We can see that power generation is restricted to daytime only, i.e. from 0800 to 1800
(10 hours), simulating generation from solar panels. Also, the power generation is not
constant, as the case with the renewable generation. Figure 3.2(b) shows the load prole.
We can see that there are some peaks (0800 - 1100 and 1800 - 2200) which show the
times when the demand is high. These times roughly correspond to times in a typical
house when household wakes up and gets ready to leave for oce and schools. Generally,
this preparation involves taking a shower, having a breakfast and watching TV for which
power-hungry devices such as the electric shower, electric kettle, microwave oven andChapter 3 Cooperative Energy Barter in Microgrids 40
toaster are used and hence the demand peaks in the morning. The second peak is in the
evening time when the household returns. The typical activities at that time include
space-heating, use of oven, microwave oven, watching TV and using computers . This
again results in the demand peak. Also, it can be seen that the demand for power is
nominal very early in the morning when household is asleep and in times other than
peak times.
Figure 3.2(c) shows the preferences for the each time period. We can see that preference
are high when the tasks are intensive and very desirable. For example, the preferences
for power in the morning is very high which can reect the household's wish to be ready
in time for the oce and school. Also, the preferences are higher for the time when
household returns and needs energy to carry out activities such as space-heating and
watching TV.
The objective of this agent is to obtain the maximum preferences possible with the given
power generation prole. Since it is equipped with a battery, it can store and use energy
later to achieve its goal more eectively. The overall utility is dened in Equation 3.2















subjected to the following constraints:
1. apt = pgt + fbt   wt
Available power at time t must not exceed the total power in the house (i.e. the
power generated, ow from the battery and waste) at time t.
2. apt  lt
Available power at t must not exceed the load at time t.
3. qt+1 = qt + bft
The next battery state depends on the current battery state and the current battery
ow.
4. q1 = q24 + bf24
The last battery state for this day is the rst battery state for the next day.Chapter 3 Cooperative Energy Barter in Microgrids 41
5. 0  qt  B
The boundaries for battery states. B is the maximum storage capacity of the
battery.
6. C 
r  bft  C+
r
The boundaries for battery ows. C+
r is the maximum ow while C 
r is the mini-
mum ow.
7. wt  pgt
Waste cannot exceed the power generated in that time period.
Since the objective function and all the constraints are linear, the optimization is a
linear programming problem which can be solved using the simplex algorithm. 2 The
following plots show the summary of optimization.























LocalOpt: Available Power (AP)
(a)




































































Figure 3.3: Optimization without energy exchange.
Figure 3.3(a) to Figure 3.3(d) show the results of optimization for this agent. There
are a couple of interesting results. Firstly, as expected, we can see that the energy is
made available for the time periods for which preference per unit power is higher. For
example, the time periods 9-11, 19-23 have higher preference (Figure 3.2(c)) and thus
2See Applied Optimization with MATLAB Programming by P.Venkataraman, for more informationChapter 3 Cooperative Energy Barter in Microgrids 42
the maximum possible energy is available to these periods, as shown in the available
power plot (Figure 3.3(a)). Also, the time periods where preference is low are allocated
the least power. The extreme cases are time periods number 2 and 13-14 where the
preference is zero for each period (Figure 3.2(c)). We see that these periods do not get
any energy (Figure 3.3(a)) which conforms the intuition.
Secondly, for the battery ow, Figure 3.3(b) shows that the battery is charged during
time periods 13-18 (positive power indicates charging and negative power indicates dis-
charging) when power is available (Figure 3.2(a)). It is discharged later in the evening
(periods 19-23) when the preferences for energy are higher.
The gure for the battery states (Figure 3.3(c)) shows the stored energy at each time
period. This again conforms with our intuition as the energy is gradually stored in the
later part of the day (time periods 13-18) up to the maximum capacity of the battery
(30 kWh) and then discharged later in the evening and early morning. Some slightly
counter-intuitive duration is the time period 9-11 when the battery is discharged in
hours when the power is available. However, this eect is due to the fact that the
battery is slightly charged in time period 8, and then it is discharged in time period 9-11
to augment the generated power. This is done as the generation prole is known and
the optimizer knows that the battery can still be charged up to the maximum capacity
in the following time periods, as evident in Figure 3.3(c) where the battery is again
charged from time period 14-19, achieving the maximum storage capacity (30kWh) in
time period 19.
A quick look may raise a question about the stored energy in the early periods when the
agent is not producing any energy (Figure 3.2(a), time period 1-8). This is due to the
fact that the battery states are linked, i.e. the last state of the battery is linked to the
rst state of the battery. In other words, the last state of the battery is the rst state
for the next day, as mentioned in Section 3.1.2.
Figure 3.3(d) shows the wasted energy. This is actually the energy that could have been
generated but the generation opportunity was intentionally missed as the storage was
not available. Comparing this gure with Figure 3.3(b), we can see that in all periods
where the energy is wasted, the demand is already met and the battery ow (charging) is
maximum and thus the opportunity to produce energy is missed as this energy is extra.
Table 3.2 provides another view of the optimization results. Here, we can also see
proles, utility and the wasted power for each time period. We observe that the amount
of wasted energy is 7kWh out of 79kWh (8%). The battery ows sum up to zero,
indicating that all the energy that is stored is withdrawn later. We can also see that
the agent achieves a utility of 131.75 out of 158 (83.3%) using 72 kWh energy. To make
sense of this number, we can compare it with the overall utility when this agent has no
battery. Figure 3.4 shows the comparison of utility per time period for this agent. We
can immediately see that the agent gets utility only in the time period when the energyChapter 3 Cooperative Energy Barter in Microgrids 43
Time Pref Load Power Battery Available Utility Waste Battery
Gen. Flow Power charge
00:00 6 2 0 -2 2 6 0 7
01:00 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 5
02:00 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 5
03:00 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
04:00 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
05:00 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
06:00 5 2 0 -2 2 5 0 5
07:00 5 2 8 5 2 5 1 3
08:00 20 10 6 -4 10 20 0 8
09:00 20 10 8 -2 10 20 0 4
10:00 20 10 8 -2 10 20 0 2
11:00 6 5 5 0 5 6 0 0
12:00 0 2 8 5 0 0 3 0
13:00 0 2 6 5 0 0 1 5
14:00 4 2 8 5 2 4 1 10
15:00 4 2 8 5 2 4 1 15
16:00 4 2 6 4 2 4 0 20
17:00 4 9 8 5 3 1.33 0 24
18:00 10 9 0 -4.16 4.16 4.62 0 29
19:00 10 9 0 -4.28 4.28 4.75 0 24.83
20:00 10 9 0 -4.55 4.55 5.05 0 20.55
21:00 10 5 0 -5 5 10 0 16
22:00 6 2 0 -2 2 6 0 11
23:00 6 2 0 -2 2 6 0 9
Total 158 100 79 0.00 72 131.75 7 -
Table 3.2: Optimization results with the utility breakdown and wasted power.
is generated (Figure 3.2(a)) as it has no battery to store this energy for later use. In
terms of numbers, without the battery this agent an overall utility of 76.55 out of 158
(48.44%) while with the battery it is 83.3% as mentioned earlier in this section.



















Figure 3.4: Utility comparison for the agent: with and without a batteryChapter 3 Cooperative Energy Barter in Microgrids 44
3.3 Optimal Energy Use With Energy Exchange
As we argued in the rst chapter, energy exchange between agents can lead to more
ecient use of energy. Let us imagine that there are two agents A and B each acting as
the energy controller device for a house. These agents have their own power generation
proles, loads and preferences as detailed in Figure 3.2 for agent A and Figure 3.5 for
agent B. We assume that agent A has some solar panels while B has a wind turbine for
power generation and that the houses are linked so that electricity can ow in either
direction as shown in Figure 3.1.









































































Figure 3.5: Power, load and preference prole for agent B.
A classical problem in cooperation is to decide about dividing the obtained utility from
cooperation. We have discussed some approaches in Section 2.3 and concluded that the
Nash bargaining solution is the most suitable solution in our problem. Therefore, we
use the Nash bargaining solution for a fair and optimal energy exchange.
In order to compute the Nash bargaining solution, agents are required to report their
information to the regulator between houses. Since this regulator decides about the
energy ow, agents must inform it about their energy generation and storage capabilities.
Furthermore, since these agents are rational and selsh, they will only cooperate with
each other if this cooperation results in higher utility for them. In other words, agentsChapter 3 Cooperative Energy Barter in Microgrids 45
will only participate if they get a higher utility than what they obtain when they work
individually. In our case, agent A and B can do no better than optimizing the energy
allocation using their batteries. We have already shown the optimization for agent A in
Figure 3.3. Here, in Figure 3.6 shows the equivalent optimization results for agent B.





















LocalOpt: Available Power (AP)
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Figure 3.6: Local Optimization (without energy exchange) results for agent B.
Firstly, we discuss these optimization results for B. Figure 3.6(a) shows the available
power to agent B. We can see that power is again allocated to time periods where
preference per unit power is higher. Figure 3.6(b) shows the battery ow. We can see
that the battery is charged and discharged throughout the day. This is due to the fact
that power is available most of the time as agent B has a wind turbine. Figure 3.6(c)
shows the battery states.
One noticeable result is that the maximum energy stored is 15kWh (time periods 20-22)
despite the fact that the maximum storage capacity was twice as much (30kWh). This,
again, is due to the fact that wind turbine generates low-power over almost all periods
which is then used immediately, as opposed to agent A which produces more power but
only in certain times of a day. In this way, we can observe that agent B is not using the
battery to its full potential.
We can also see that agent B does not miss any opportunity to generate energy, henceChapter 3 Cooperative Energy Barter in Microgrids 46
Time Pref Load Power Battery Available Utility Waste Battery
Gen. Flow Power charge
00:00 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 13
01:00 6 2 2 0 2 6 0 13
02:00 4 2 1 -1 2 4 0 13
03:00 4 1 1 0 1 4 0 12
04:00 4 1 3 2 1 4 0 12
05:00 4 1 1 0 1 4 0 14
06:00 2 1 0 -1 1 2 0 14
07:00 2 1 1 0 1 2 0 13
08:00 20 8 0 -5 5 12.5 0 13
09:00 20 8 4 -4 8 20 0 8
10:00 20 8 4 -4 8 20 0 4
11:00 2 3 4 4 0 0 0 0
12:00 10 1 3 2 1 10 0 4
13:00 4 1 5 4 1 4 0 6
14:00 2 1 2 1 1 2 0 10
15:00 2 1 1 0 1 2 0 11
16:00 6 1 1 0 1 6 0 11
17:00 6 1 3 2 1 6 0 11
18:00 6 6 2 2 0 0 0 13
19:00 10 6 1 -0.01 1.01 1.68 0 15
20:00 10 6 1 0.01 0.98 1.63 0 14.98
21:00 10 3 1 -2 3 10 0 15
22:00 10 1 1 0 1 10 0 13
23:00 10 1 1 0 1 10 0 13
Total 174 67 43 0 42.99 141.81 0 -
Table 3.3: Agent B: Optimization results (without energy exchange) with the utility
breakdown and wasted power
the empty plot for waste energy(Figure 3.6(d)).
In terms of utility, Table 3.3 shows the utility breakdown for agent B. The overall utility
for agent B is 141.8 out of 174 (81.4%).Chapter 3 Cooperative Energy Barter in Microgrids 47
3.3.1 Nash Bargaining Solution
Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 show that the overall utility is 131 and 141 for agent A and B
respectively, when they work alone or, in other words, when no energy exchange takes
place. As described in Section 2.3, the Nash bargaining solution requires disagreement
values, or the least utilities for which agents will be willing to cooperate. Since, agent
A and B can gain the utilities of 131 and 141 respectively, on their own, they will only
be willing to cooperate if they get more utility than these utilities. Therefore, we take
these utilities as the disagreement values in the Nash bargaining solution and formulate





[ua(APa)   ua(da)]  [ub(APb)   ub(db)] (3.5)
Where ua is the utility function of agent A, ua(da) is the disagreement utility of agent
A which we have already computed to be at 131, APa is the power allocation prole for
the agent a, and therefore, ua(APa) computes the overall utility for the given available
power prole APa, ub is the utility function of agent B, ub(bd) is the disagreement utility
of agent B which we have already computed to be at 141, APb is the power allocation
prole for the agent B and nally ua(APb) computes the overall utility for a given
available power prole APb.
Equation 3.5 is subjected to the constraints number 2 to 6 listed in Section 3.3.Here
we list one modied constraint (constraint number 1 in Section 3.3) and an additional
constraint below:
1. pgt = apt + bft + wt + linkt
The power generated equals the sum of power used immediately, the battery ow,
the waste and the power sent towards the other agent (i.e. link).
8.  linkcap  link  linkcap
The ow on the link cannot exceed the maximum transmission capacity.
We can use the interior-point algorithm 3 to solve this problem. Below, we discuss the
optimization results for both agents.
3.3.2 Optimization results via the Nash bargaining solution: Agent A
Figure 3.7 shows the result of optimization for agent A when energy exchange is an op-
tion. Figure 3.7(a) shows the available power prole using the Nash bargaining solution.
3Applied Optimization with MATLAB Programming by P.Venkataraman, for more informationChapter 3 Cooperative Energy Barter in Microgrids 48
We can compare it with the Figure 3.3(a) for the optimized allocation of power when no
energy exchange takes place. Some obvious changes are in the pattern in the evening.
We can see that with the energy exchange, agent A gets more power in evening where its
preferences are higher. Before the energy exchange, the maximum power available for
agent A was 5kWh which is the maximum ow allowed from the battery. However, with
the energy exchange it can also get power from agent B in evening to meet its highly
preferred demands. The power that comes from agent B can be seen in Figure 3.8(e).
The negative readings show the power coming from agent B to agent A and the positive
readings show the power from agent A towards agent B. We see that there is a signicant
amount of power coming from agent B during the late evening while a good amount of
power goes from agent A during the afternoon which ensures that both agents meet
their demands with high preferences.
Another aspect is the energy waste analysis. We can see that around 7kWh energy is
wasted in a day with no energy exchange (see Figure 3.3(d)) due to the limited battery of
agent A(30kWh). However, the energy exchange enables agent A to send this power to
agent B which stores it. Thus, via energy exchange agent A not only reduces its energy
loss but also get some of this energy back later in the evening as evident in Figure 3.8(e).
Figure 3.3(c) and Figure 3.7(c) show the battery states without and with energy ex-
change respectively. We can immediately observe that the battery stores more energy
when the energy exchange is allowed than when it is not allowed. Obviously, the extra
energy comes from agent B and is returned later. Therefore, we can deduce that when
the energy exchange is allowed, agents can make more ecient use of their storage.
In terms of utility, Table 3.4 shows the comparison of utilities for agent A with and
without energy exchange. We can see that that there is a negative change of utility
in time period 18 when agent A gets a utility of 1.33 with local optimization but with
energy exchange it gets zero in this time period. However, there are positive changes
in time periods 19-21 when agent A gets more utility from energy exchange than local
optimization. Indeed, the overall utility of agent A with local optimization is 131.78
while with the energy exchange it rises to 136.94, a net change of 5.16 or 3.91%.
One interesting point here is that agents can provide their disagreement utilities in two
ways. They can either provide a single number representing their overall utility (i.e. ud)
or they can provide a set of disagreement utilities for each time period (i.e. ud
t). When
an agent provides just the overall utility, it will cooperate as long as it gets a better
overall utility. In this case, it does not care about the utility in each period. On the
other hand, if an agent provides a set of disagreement utilities, then it is will cooperate
only if it gets a better utility in each time period. This approach may be useful where
agents have some minimum loads requirements (such as critical loads) in some or all
time periods.Chapter 3 Cooperative Energy Barter in Microgrids 49
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Figure 3.7: Agent A: Optimization via the Nash bargaining solution. In Figure (e),
the negative readings show the power coming from agent B to agent A and the positive
readings show the power from agent A towards agent B.
3.3.3 Optimization results via the Nash bargaining solution: Agent B
Figure 3.8 shows the optimization result for agent B when energy exchange is an option.
We can see that the pattern for the available power changes (Figure 3.8(a) as compared
to the Figure 3.6(a)) particularly in evening time. This is the time of the day when
the power is preferred, as evident in the preferences of agent B (Figure 3.5(c)). The
plots for the battery ow and for the battery states (Figure 3.8(b) and Figure 3.8(c))Chapter 3 Cooperative Energy Barter in Microgrids 50
Without Energy Exchange With Energy Exchange
Time AP Utility Waste AP Utility Waste Link
00:00 2 6 0 2 6 0 -1.16
01:00 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.42
02:00 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.03
03:00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1
04:00 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.45
05:00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25
06:00 2 5 0 2 5 0 -0.12
07:00 2 5 1 2 5 0 2.72
08:00 10 20 0 10 20 0 1
09:00 10 20 0 10 20 0 1.43
10:00 10 20 0 10 20 0 1.77
11:00 5 6 0 5 6 0 -2.92
12:00 0 0 3 0 0 0 3
13:00 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
14:00 2 4 1 2 4 0 1.93
15:00 2 4 1 2 4 0 2.58
16:00 2 4 0 2 4 0 2.1
17:00 3 1.33 0 0 0 0 3
18:00 4.16 4.62 0 7.77 8.64 0 -3.68
19:00 4.28 4.75 0 5.64 6.27 0 -2.11
20:00 4.55 5.05 0 5.43 6.03 0 -2.34
21:00 5 10 0 5 10 0 -1.4
22:00 2 6 0 2 6 0 -1.13
23:00 2 6 0 2 6 0 -1.07
Total 71.99 131.75 7 74.84 136.94 0 4.05
Table 3.4: Utility comparison for Agent A: with and without energy exchange
show the comparative increase in the battery use when energy exchange is not an option
(Figure 3.6(b) and Figure 3.6(c)). This again supports our argument that agents can
utilize their storage more eectively when energy exchange is allowed. Another inter-
esting point is that there is no energy waste in optimization, both with and without the
energy exchange (Figure 3.6(d) and Figure 3.8(d)). This implies that agents do not nec-
essarily need to have waste energy in order to obtain better results in energy exchange.
A simple exchange of energy to match agents' preferences in a better way can result in
better utility for both agents.
Table 3.5 shows the comparison of utilities for agent B in optimization with and without
the energy exchange. We can see that, due to an optimal allocation of energy, there
are some positive changes in few periods (19-21). In fact, the overall utility for agent B
increases by 5.46%, from 141.83 to 149.58.Chapter 3 Cooperative Energy Barter in Microgrids 51
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Figure 3.8: Agent B: Optimization via the Nash bargaining solution. In Figure (e),
the negative readings show the power coming from agent B to agent A and the positive
readings show the power from agent A towards agent B.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we described our model and experiments and showed how an energy
exchange can lead to better use of energy and higher utilities for the participants. We
observed that both agents in our example increased their utilities by 4% to 5 % via
energy exchange. It can be argued that such exchange does not oer a great deal of
improvement. However, this improvement depends on the diversity in preferences, powerChapter 3 Cooperative Energy Barter in Microgrids 52
Without Energy Exchange With Energy Exchange
Time AP Utility Waste AP Utility Waste Link
00:00 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1.16
01:00 2 6 0 2 6 0 -0.42
02:00 2 4 0 2 4 0 -0.03
03:00 1 4 0 1 4 0 0.1
04:00 1 4 0 1 4 0 -0.45
05:00 1 4 0 1 4 0 0.25
06:00 1 2 0 1 2 0 -0.12
07:00 1 2 0 1 2 0 2.72
08:00 5 12.5 0 6 15 0 1
09:00 8 20 0 8 20 0 1.43
10:00 8 20 0 8 20 0 1.77
11:00 0 0 0 0 0 0 -2.92
12:00 1 10 0 1 10 0 3
13:00 1 4 0 1 4 0 1
14:00 1 2 0 1 2 0 1.93
15:00 1 2 0 1 2 0 2.58
16:00 1 6 0 1 6 0 2.1
17:00 1 6 0 1 6 0 3
18:00 0 0 0 0 0 0 -3.68
19:00 1.02 1.68 0 2.76 4.6 0 -2.11
20:00 0.98 1.63 0 2.39 3.98 0 -2.34
21:00 3 10 0 3 10 0 -1.4
22:00 1 10 0 1 10 0 -1.13
23:00 1 10 0 1 10 0 -1.07
Total 43 141.81 0 47.15 149.58 0 4.05
Table 3.5: Utility comparison for Agent B: with and without energy exchange
and load generation of agents. With more agents, this diversity is likely to increase and
therefore it can give better improvements over utilities. Besides gain in utility, we have
also shown the energy loss can be reduced and agents can use their appliances and
storage devices more eciently.
At this stage, our model assumes a mediator (i.e. the regulator) between houses. This
is against the requirement of a decentralized solution. Our next step is to remove this
mediator to enable agents to negotiate directly with each other. We can then use this
solution to benchmark the decentralized solution and measure its performance.Chapter 4
Conclusions and Future Work
4.1 Conclusions
In this report, we discussed the ever-increasing need of energy and the problems of
reliance on fossil fuels. We reviewed some contemporary proposals to address these issues
such as microgeneration, smart houses, microgrids and smart grids and we noted that
these proposals open up the possibility of energy exchange which is a common practice
for ecient use of energy in larger networks such as between utility companies. We
presented a scenario of a small network of smart houses and then discussed the benets of
energy exchange such as the ecient use of energy, reduction in carbon emissions, better
management of intermittent resources, reduction in energy storage loss and more ecient
use of storage etc. We then discussed the challenges and requirements of such energy
exchange between houses. We noted that these requirements are common in domains of
multiagent systems, game theory, bargaining theory and peer-to-peer networks and we
identied specic topics of interest in these domains for literature review.
We then presented a model of two agents representing two houses. We optimized the
use of energy for both agents when energy exchange is an option. We observed that in
some cases, agents may miss the opportunity to generate energy due to limited storage
capacity. We then used the Nash bargaining solution to compute an energy exchange
between agents. We noted that such an exchange is benecial to both agents as they
gain more utility than when they work individually. We also noted that agents can
use their storage more eciently when exchange is an option. Thus, we concluded that
energy exchange between houses can result in ecient energy use and ecient use of
energy resources.
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4.2 Future Work
At this stage, we have a centralized solution. Our model needs a mediator between
houses which computes the energy exchange. Since it is against our requirements as we
need a decentralized solution, it is essential that we remove this mediator. This requires
us to consider a strategic bargaining model and as we discussed in the Section 2.3, we
choose the Rubinstein's model to proceed our investigation. As discussed earlier, this
model assumes full information and may not provide a fully-edged solution for energy
exchange. However, we use this model as the point of our departure and we will consider
such shortcomings along our path.
We are also interested in the case, where agents negotiate via mediator and misreport
their information to this mediator. We would like to see if such settings are exploitable
and if an agent can manipulate the bargaining outcome in their favour by reporting false
information.
Another direction of future work is to model uncertainty in energy generation. Re-
newable energy generation weather-dependent and therefore their output is uncertain.
Agents must consider this uncertainty when they make oer to other parties. One way
to achieve this is to ensure that agents express their belief about uncertainty in their
oers. For example, if an agent believes that it can generate 5kWh in a particular time
period with a probability of 0.8, then it must pass this probabilistic measures in its oer
to other agents. Also, We also need to consider what circumstances where an agent fails
to meet his committed oers.
In the mini-thesis which is due in January, 2011, we intend to include a reasonably
real-world model of strategic bargaining for energy exchange between houses.
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